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Abstract 
Exorbitant executive compensation packages have drawn large criticism from the 
public eye and with the recent financial crisis and the previous tech bubble opinion on 
executive incentives has forced government institutions to respond. Over the past two 
decades the SEC and FASB have aimed to respond to the public and with three large 
regulation changes in the 2000s, pay for performance compensation has gone through 
many changes. In this study I build on previous work in an attempt to answer whether or 
not executives within the Information Technology industry have seen a larger decline in 
option compensation when compared to executives outside of the industry. Previous 
studies have indicated that option use has been consistently higher in the IT industry and 
in addition another study has showed that option use across all companies has decreased 
dramatically due to regulation changes. In this study I find that option use has 
dramatically decreased over the past decade due to regulation and that option use in the 
IT industry has remained consistently higher than others. I find that there is little 
significant evidence suggesting regulation changes have affected the IT industry at a 
larger rate than others. I would argue that the industry is less sensitive to regulation 
changes regarding option use but I do find significant evidence that the industry has seen 
larger decreases in option use in 2013 when compared to other industries. 
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I. Introduction 
When selecting compensation strategies for top executives a company uses a 
portfolio of company assets in creating a compensation package for their executives. The 
total value of the assets in these packages vary based on what kind resources are used as 
well as their fair market value at the time. These portfolios generally consist of a variety 
of assets, including Cash, Stock Options, Retirement Packages, Inside Debt and other 
Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPS) (Investopedia.com). The company uses all these 
payment types in an effort to encourage high performance. Since these assets are affected 
by market prices a company encourages performance by tying the value of company 
prices to compensation value. This pay for performance strategy incentivizes top 
executives to increase performance and help build value at the firm company. For 
example, stock options are more valuable when a company has a high stock price, this 
would mean any executive who is compensated with company stock would be 
encourages to increase company stock performance and subsequently raise his own 
compensation value. Other types of assets such as Cash payments are not a type of pay 
for performance instrument but are instead in compensation packages as a preventative 
measure against executives who might be making high risk decisions in hopes of 
increasing compensation value.  
In 1992 the average CEO of an S&P500 firm earned $2.7 million in compensation 
and by 2000 the average pay had increased to over $14 million in compensation. This 
meant that CEOs were being paid 82 times the earning of an average worker and by 2005 
CEOs were being paid 369 times the earning amount of an average worker. Under the 
accounting guidelines at the time companies did not have to incur an accounting charge 
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for options, and other payment methods, on their financial statements (Gine 2007 & 
Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000). 
1 
In the graph above we can see that the mean of CFO and CEO executive 
compensation reached an all time high in 2000 and was drastically increasing in the nine 
years prior. The average compensation these executives were receiving was larger than 
$3 million in 2000 and has now reached the same level once again in 2014. Even with 
these expansive compensation packages, salary payments to CEOs and CFOs were 
miniscule compared to other compensation methods.  
It is safe to say that these exorbitant payments were met with large opposition in 
the public eye. In the modern day where data is shared through a large amount of 
                                                          
1 This graph and all others were created using Execucomp Data from the years 1992 – 2014. The data was 
limited to only CEO and CFO compensation. The graph represents the mean of total compensation and the 
mean of cash compensation of these two executives during the past 22 years. Specific data summaries will 
be provided later in this paper. 
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mediums the average worker can easily find the amounts CEOs and other executives are 
paid. Public opinion became so influential companies started to adjust their structure of 
executive compensation packages in response to the outlash. Even the largest of 
companies succumbed to this pressure; in 2009 Goldman Sachs acknowledged that public 
anger about high executive compensation constrained the pay of its top five executives 
(Kuhnen 2012). The Dot-Com bubble and the recent financial crisis have brought light to 
exorbitant compensation packages and public opinion has begun to harshly criticize 
companies for their large pay regardless of executive performance. 
"...The truth is that boards of directors and compensation 
committees have adopted the modern standard of behavior: What's 
acceptable is what you can get away with. The executive-pay 
system is rigged. It has become an incestuous daisy chain of 
mutual greed and payoffs. Whether executives perform well or 
poorly, they rake in the riches. Heads they win, tails they win. For 
every executive who truly deserves his millions, a hundred others 
are ripping off their companies and shareholders..."(Gilmor 1997) 
 
Government involvement in this issue has increased over the past two decades. 
Several measures such as the Dodd Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as well as 
several accounting standards have been passed over this time frame in an attempt to 
increase visibility of just how much executives are making. The Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) passed one of these measures in 2004 and required companies 
to expense equity based compensation and reflect it in the financial statements based on 
the fair value of the awarded assets (Gine 2007 and FASB 2004). FAS 123 (r), as the 
standard is codified, also required all compensation information to be reported, under 
DEF14A, in 6 new tables, which covered everything from a summary of compensation to 
any outstanding awards. By responding to the public and creating these new guidelines 
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the SEC and FASB have helped increase the visibility of compensation over recent years 
and brought to light the true extent of pay for performance methods. But have these 
regulations affected certain industries more than others? Have the new accounting 
regulations of expensing these awards made it hard for capital-intensive industries to 
continue using stock options as well as other pay for performance methods?  
A. Executive Compensation in Technology 
One industry in particular has been known to use stock options as well as other 
pay for performance methods more than any other, the information technology industry. 
Focused largely in Silicon Valley the IT industry has revolved all compensation around 
stock options and has been known to do so for quite some time. “From Intel in the 1960s 
to Apple in the 1970s to Silicon Graphics in the 1980s to Netscape and a host of others in 
the 1990s, enough Silicon Valley companies have delivered enough stock option jackpots 
to enough employees to create an entirely new business culture” (Fox 1997). Culture in 
Silicon Valley is very important to success in the industry and in this study we will assess 
whether companies in the area have seen a larger amount of change due to the recent 
regulation changes than others. There are two large incentives for tech companies to use 
forms of payment aside from cash. The first incentive is the greater retention they can 
create with stock and the second is to keep cash on hand. In the IT industry stock options 
are even used in compensating entry-level employees, especially in startups where the 
cost to compensate in cash is much higher due to increased competitiveness with mature 
companies. 
The motivation behind this paper is to assess whether the aforementioned 
regulation changes have had a larger negative impact on companies within the 
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Information Technology industry as a whole when compared to other industries. By 
formulating a regression that factors in variables associated with option use I will able to 
quantify the changes regulation have had on option use and I will also be able to identify 
the differences in option use between the IT industry and companies outside of it. 
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II. Literature Review 
In this section I will cover the respective regulations that have been passed within 
the previous two decades as well as their possible effects on compensation within various 
industries. I will also cover previous literature that pertains to the matter of executive 
compensation as well as previous works that pertain to compensation within the 
technology industry. Finally, I will conclude with any works that pertain to variable 
choices and common practices in which compensation is valued and assessed. Most 
research in this area delves into the specific compensation forms but does not cover the 
changes across specific industries nor does it cover as long of a time period as this study. 
The increased visibility of executive compensation in recent years and the new regulatory 
changes have affected company reporting, expensing, and compensating behavior and 
social issues along with recent crises have led to an increase in the discussion about 
executive compensation in recent years.  
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A. Regulation 
In the past two decades we have seen three large reforms, which changed the 
transparency of compensation in addition to changing company incentives regarding the 
various forms of compensation awards. In this section I will cover these three different 
regulations, their history, their specific requirements and their realized effects as well as 
any possible effects they may have had. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The first of these regulations is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and is commonly known 
as SOX. Signed into law by President Bush in 2002, this piece of regulation was intended 
to control the conditions and cultural influences that lead to multiple fraudulent business 
practices in the year 2000-2002. The fall of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco uncovered the 
large internal conflicts companies faced as well as the compensation methods that 
encouraged executives into riskier business practices (Farrell 2007). Although the Act did 
little to impact executive compensation transparency directly, the act did contain one 
strong provision which had the potential to have a large impact on compensation 
practices. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gave the SEC unprecedented power 
over compensation. The specifics of the section and the specific regulation is as follows: 
“If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material 
noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting 
requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial 
officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for –  
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(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received 
by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following the 
first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever occurs) of 
the financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; 
and 
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-
month period.”(SOXCPA 2009). 
As we can see from the above cases, this section of that act clearly gives the SEC 
the power to control executive compensation and even force the forfeiture of 
bonuses and profits that any CEO or CFO has received within a given year if 
fraudulent business practices are exposed. Unfortunately the act may not be 
perceived as being effective. The first instance of the section’s use was in 2007 
and up until December of 2013 the section has only been used 31 times 
(Morgenson 2013). Much of this can be attributed to the threat these clawbacks 
have posed to the executives. The time as well as monetarily consuming litigation 
have forced companies to tighten on their reporting and has led to a decrease in 
the financial errors in reporting and a fall in financial restatements since its 
passing (Morgenson 2013). For the purpose of this study we should not expect a 
large change in compensation value or any component value of compensation 
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packages in the year of 2002 or any the following years whether we are focusing 
on the IT industry or outside of it.2 
FAS123(R) 
 In 2005, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), under pressure from 
the SEC, modified FAS123, a standard that previously required disclosure of stock option 
positions but did not require any income statement expensing. FASB revised FAS123 to 
require the expensing of stock options when granted. The expensing of these options 
under rule FAS123(R) is required and is to be prepared “using a fair-value-based method 
that is similar in most respects to the fair-value-based method established in Statement 
123” (FASB 2004). The fair-value based rule that was established in FAS123(R) has now 
changed to require all companies to use the Black-Scholes Method of stock option 
valuation to determine expense costs (FASB 2004). 
This new rule implemented by the FASB has the largest realizable change of the 
three regulations mentioned in this section. Expensing of compensation outside Salary 
has not been required up until 2004. This meant that one of the largest sections of total 
compensation was left out. I predict that the largest change in compensation, specifically 
stock option compensation, will come in the year following this accounting change. The 
expensing of options will incentivize companies to reduce this form of compensation in 
order to keep a larger share of income. 
A study conducted in 2012 by Hayes Lemmon and Qiu (2010) observed “firms 
dramatically reduce their usage of stock options after the adoption of FAS123R and that 
                                                          
2 This study uses dummies in years following regulation changes in order to assess the affects these laws 
have had in the following year. This law does not directly impact option share use, regardless of industry, 
and does not have any significant results to compensation change. 
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the decline in option use is strongly associated with a proxy for accounting costs.”3 In this 
study we will observe these changes on the IT industry and specifically whether the usage 
of stock options has decreased more than other industries. 
Dodd-Frank Act 
The last of these regulatory changes is the Dodd Frank Act, which was passed in 
2010. Included in the act are five sections, which required more oversight on executive 
compensation and shareholder acknowledgment of compensation. The sections are as 
follows: 
 Section 951: Requires advisory votes of shareholders about executive 
compensation and parachutes. Also requires institutional investment managers to 
report their voting on advisory shareholder votes. 
 Section 952: Requires disclosure about the role of, and potential conflicts 
involving, compensation consultants. This statute also requires the Commission to 
direct that the exchanges adopt listing standards that include certain enhanced 
independence requirements for members of issuers’ compensation committees. 
The Commission is also directed to establish competitively neutral independence 
factors for all who are retained to advise compensation committees. 
 Section 953: Requires additional disclosure about certain compensation matters, 
including pay-for-performance and the ratio between the CEO’s total 
compensation and the median total compensation for all other company 
employees. 
                                                          
3 A second component of this study was to observe FAS123R affects on risky investment practices and 
found no significant results.  
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 Section 954: Requires the Commission to direct the exchanges to prohibit the 
listing of securities of issuers that have not developed and implemented 
compensation claw-back policies. 
 Section 955: Requires additional disclosure about whether directors and 
employees are permitted to hedge any decrease in market value of the company’s 
stock (SEC 2015). 
Over the course of five years the SEC has gradually voted on these sections and within 
the past few years only a few have been signed into law. There are two reasons we should 
expect this new act to have an insignificant affect on executive compensation in recent 
years. The first of these reasons is due to the directness of the act towards the financial 
industry. Taking place right after the financial crisis these rules were created to target 
large financial institutions and help increase transparency within the organizations. 
Secondly, the recent changes in regulation have not all been in effect during our data 
range. Ending at 2014, Execucomp data will be unable to capture how all of these 
changes have affected compensation with the exception of the first two sections, which 
pertain to disclosure. Section 951 and 952 of the act are the only sections of the five 
which have been adopted by the SEC. Section 951 was adopted in January of 2011 and 
Section 952 was adopted in June of 2012 (SEC 2015). I do not predict that the value of 
options awarded to executives will change in the final year of our study due to the limited 
number of sections in implementation at the time of this study. In addition the increasing 
disclosures and transparency of compensation does not have a direct affect on 
compensation incentives as the previous two regulations mentioned. 
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B. “Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry“ 
Written by Mark C. Anderson, Rajiv D. Banker, and Sury Ravindran, this paper is 
the only recent analysis of executive compensation, and in specific, compensation within 
the information technology industry. Conducted in 2000 this study takes a look at the 
aggressive use of employee stock options in Silicon Valley. This is the only paper which 
analyzes and develops a regression which differentiates between the use of compensation 
in the IT industry and outside of it. The study indicated executives at IT firms “received a 
greater portion of their total compensation in the form of stock options” even after 
controlling for economic factors. The regression used in this study takes into account 
many of the economic factors as well as local company factors in determining the effect 
IT culture has on option compensation (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000).  
However, the paper does not suggest or analyze any changes in compensation 
throughout specific time periods. Although the paper used Execucomp data, only four 
years of data (1992-1996) was used in the study and no time variable was accounted for. 
In my analysis I will use a similar regression as in this paper but will focus on time trends 
as well as focusing on changes within specific years due to the regulation introductions. 
Company size is also a determining factor when it comes to sensitivity on compensation 
and in my analysis I will differentiate companies based on their market value.4 
C. Compensation Regulation 
Previous studies have observed the affect regulation has had on compensation. In 
1992 the SEC and Congress passed legislation under the Internal Revenue Code Section 
                                                          
4 All variables mentioned in this study and used in regression analysis can be found in Table 2 along with 
their descriptions 
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162(m), which required disclosure of compensation levels for top executives. Analysis 
showed that increased transparency helped reduce compensation growth rates and even 
reduced compensation in some companies (Perry and Zenner 2001). In addition to this 
disclosure, Congress deemed any “pay above $1 million that is not tied to performance 
[to be] deemed ‘excessive’ and [not] eligible to be deducted from corporate income for 
tax purposes”(Dew-Becker 2009). An even larger change occurred in 2006 when the SEC 
required all companies to disclose all forms of compensation (Dew-Becker 2009). These 
regulations show that companies respond significantly to regulation changes and as a 
whole tend to adjust compensation based on the incentive changes. As mentioned earlier 
Hayes Lemmon and Qiu (2010) observed drastic changes to compensation packages 
following regulation changes. In my study the goal is to differentiate these regulation 
change effects on the IT industry. 
D. Performance Based Compensation 
Over the years many scholars have addressed and attempted to explain the 
theories behind compensation and specifically the relation between performance and the 
payoff executives should receive. Holmstrom (1979) stated that there “has long been 
recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise when individuals engage in risk 
sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the probability 
distribution of the outcome.” Holmstrom (1979) argues that this “moral hazard” is solved 
over time when the availability of information allows principals to renegotiate contracts 
information asymmetry is reduced. However, in order to compensate for issues 
surrounding asymmetric information firms choose to tie current and future performance 
to compensation of managers in order to incentivize strong performance and attract 
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managers with similar objectives (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Not only do these 
studies relate pay to performance, they also relate performance to pay. Boschen and 
Smith argue that the performance of a company relies heavily on the pay managers 
receive as pay is directly correlated with the firm’s expectation of the manager’s ability, 
thus the higher the pay the more experienced and successful the manager is likely to be 
(Boschen and Smith 1995). In this study I will not take a look into pay for performance 
metrics or incentives. Instead, I will focus solely on the effects these regulation changes 
have had on compensation.   
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III. Methodology & Theory 
In this section my primary objective is to outline a framework that will allow me 
to investigate time differences in the value and components of executive compensation 
and more specifically between IT firms and other firms. By identifying the key drivers 
that affect option use I can regress a model that will correctly identify the correlation 
between time and industry location in the effect of option use.   
A. Endogenous Variable 
The primary objective of this study is to observe the change in use of alternative 
forms of compensation over the past 22 years and determine whether regulation has had a 
large effect on firm use of options and bonuses in compensation packages to CEOs and 
CFOs in the Information Technology industry. OptionShare5 is the specific endogenous 
variable we will observe in the analysis.  
  
                                                          
5 The description for calculation of Option Share is found in Table 2 
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I will try to understand how time has played a role in the use of options as well as 
determining which regulations had the largest affect and whether or not option use was 
affected in the IT industry at a greater rate than others. As you can see above, the average 
amount of OptionShare as a percentage of total compensation is over 10% larger for 
executives within the Information Technology industry vs. those outside of the industry. 
A general trend can be observed within OptionShare data by taking a look at the changes 
this in this variable over time. 
 
The graph above depicts the trend OptionShares have followed over the past 22 
years. It is clear the firms in the IT industry have always been more aggressive in the use 
of this form of compensation in their packages, however it is intriguing to note that 
within the past five years the mean OptionShare within the industry has fallen at a 
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greater rate than that of other industries and the difference is very small in the year 2014. 
If we look at the respective means of the IT and non-IT industries we find that on average 
the OptionShare for an executive in the IT industry is over 10% higher than in non-IT 
industries (32.75% vs. 21.82%).6 If we take a look at median OptionShare the story is 
the same, with executives in the IT industry earning more than 24% of their 
compensation through options vs. 14.46% for non-IT executives. In 2014 option share in 
IT companies was less than 2% more than non-IT companies (13.35% vs. 11.55%). Both 
mean and median differences for OptionShare are significant under a P-value evaluation 
of under .05. This falls in line with my hypothesis that the IT industry has been affected 
by the changing regulations at a larger amount than other industries in North America. 
We can see that in the year 2006, following the passing of the revised law of FAS 123R 
option use within the IT industry continued to fall for the following three years while the 
use of options in other industries seems to be marginally decreasing over the same time 
period.  
B. Economic Factors 
In order to correctly account for OptionShare correlation in the regression I will 
also need to factor in economic factors that have played a role in compensation levels 
over time. Generally compensation is based on company performance and to account for 
this performance I will identify three variables, which can be used to account and proxy 
for economic factors that influence option use as well as value. These three proxies will 
                                                          
6 You can find specific mean and median averages, as well as p-value calculations for all variables spoken 
about in this section on Table 5 
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account for changes in growth opportunities as well as the different objective timelines 
that companies focus on.  
The first of these variables is the Book-to-Market ratio. The Book-to-Market 
ratio is used in multiple previous studies to represent the number growth opportunities a 
firm has (Gaver and Gaver 1993). Essentially a company that has more growth 
opportunities will trade at a higher market value than the book value of the assets in the 
company. Companies will trade at a larger excess over book value if the investment 
opportunities of the firm are larger (Myers 1997). In addition this variable will also take 
into account the effect of debt riskiness in company strategy (Myers 1977). The book to 
market ratios between IT firms and non-IT firms are fairly similar as we can see in Table 
6. On average IT companies have a slightly higher mean but this does not fall under a 
significant difference in a p-value calculation. In addition, upon calculating the median 
Book-to-Market ratios we find that non-IT firms have a slightly higher median but it is 
also not indicative of any true difference between industries. 
The second factor which affects compensation is company performance and in 
this study I will compensate for this correlation using Return on stock price as well as a 
Lagged Return variable. As done by Anderson, Banker and Ravindran (2000) a lagged 
Return variable is used because a portion of compensation is dependent on previous year 
performance in addition to current year performance (Murphy 1985). In primary 
observations we can see that the difference in mean values of Return and Lagged Return 
between IT and non-IT industries is insignificant and due to large outlier influences it is 
more reasonable to compare median observations. Looking at our median values we can 
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see that the non-IT industries have a slightly higher Return as well as Lagged Return 
when compared to IT companies. 
Finally the dividend rate can be used to account for economic factors. Companies 
which do not payout dividends are likely to reinvest the income for future growth 
opportunities while companies that do not have many opportunities are more likely to pay 
dividends to shareholders (Gaver and Gaver 1995). These three variables will compensate 
for any growth factors, which play a role in use of compensation components as well as 
compensation component values (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000). From Table 6 
we can see that companies in the IT industry, on average, pay fewer dividends to 
shareholders and this falls in line with the hypothesis that IT companies tend to pay fewer 
dividends because of greater investment opportunities.  
C. Age 
Age is a variable that can be used as a proxy for multiple factors. First of all age 
can provide companies with information pertaining to executive ability (Murphy 1986). 
In addition to more experience, a manager with a longer track record will reduce 
information asymmetry regardless of whether previous performance was positive or 
negative. Information about compensation expectations will also be clearer with older 
executives. CEOs with more experience in their career are more likely to demand higher 
compensation than younger CEOs. In addition to increased information, executives who 
are younger will more likely focus on long-term objectives due to their age, while older 
executives may be less concerned about long-term performance as they get closer to 
retirement (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran 2000). As we can see form the graph below 
it seems that non-IT executives have generally been slightly older than IT executives but 
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the difference has become smaller over the past decade. The average as well as median 
age of IT executives is 52 years, four years younger than the average Non-IT executive. 
The p-value for test of difference indicated that the difference is significant. 
 
D. Volatility 
 Volatility has played a role in compensation structure due to the increased 
riskiness of option value changes. Executives would rather be compensated with larger 
cash or salary portions if the volatility of company stock can greatly influence the value 
of options. With this increased risk in stock executives will negotiate for other forms of 
compensation. On the other hand, it is possible that companies will grant executives with 
more options in order to compensate for higher volatility in option value.  
As well as a representation of risk in value changes, volatility can also be used as 
a proxy for innovation or growth opportunities within a company. Previous research has 
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showed that companies with long-term objectives and risky projects favor central 
ownership rather than outside ownership of stock (Francis and Smith 1995). In the IT 
industry companies are more volatile when comparing both means and medians to non-IT 
companies, in addition the difference is significant when using a p-value calculation.  
E. Ownership & Structure 
The amount of stock an executive receives in compensation may affect incentives 
if stock ownership represents a large amount of outstanding stock. Stock ownership can 
have two effects, the first of which is a convergence of interests. If an executive’s wealth 
is composed of a majority of stock it would be inefficient to reward this executive with 
more stock compensation in order to boost performance incentives (Anderson, Banker 
and Ravindran 2000). Awarding these executives with too much stock will reduce the 
effect that performance incentives provide. Entrenchment can occur when an executive 
owns a larger amount of outstanding stock when compared to other shareholders. Owning 
such high levels of outstanding stock “insulates the manager from market discipline, 
which may lead to greater personal consumption of firm resources (higher total pay) and 
suboptimal decision making (lower firm performance) “(Anderson, Banker and 
Ravindran 2000). As done by (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran (2000) I also define two 
variables, which account for executive holdings of outstanding stock in forms of options 
as well as stock. I compare stock held to total pay as well as firm equity and in addition I 
compare options held to total pay as well as firm equity.  
In the graph below we can see that IT company executives have held a higher 
percentage of Shares Outstanding than their non-IT counterparts. However the difference 
has decreased throughout the past 19 years and the difference between these executives 
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has become much smaller, specifically within the past six years. In Table 6 we can find 
all four of the variables mentioned in the previous paragraph as well as their respective 
mean and medians. Observing the p-value for test of difference we find all of the 
variables to be significantly differentiated except for Options Held/Firm Equity, which 
is just slightly above the significance boundary of 0.05. 
 
The company’s structure will also influence the level of incentive based pay an 
executive will receive in compensation. Debt to Assets has been suggested to affect 
incentive based compensation depending on how a company is structured. Companies 
with larger debt would often prefer less risky projects and will appropriately compensate 
executives with less stock based income (John and John 1993). Other researchers have 
conflicted on the issue, Garvey and Mawani (1999) found that stock options may be used 
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to reduce incentivizing risky projects when debt levels are high but found that there was 
“no evidence that risk-taking incentives are increased by financial leverage.” 
 
F. Size 
 Size will reflect the compensation structure as well. Larger companies will often 
hire more experienced executives while smaller ones will hire younger ones and in turn 
pay smaller compensation packages. Controlling for company size will reduce the affect 
of company incentives on executive pay has on our independent variable. In addition to 
differing experience in CEOs and CFOs, smaller companies will often use other forms of 
compensation aside from salaries and bonuses due to capital constraints. In this study 
company size will be adjusted for by using the Market Value. 
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G. Time 
 I will introduce four times variables in this study. First of which will be a time 
trend variable that will cover all 22 years of this study. The final three will consist of 
dummy variables for each year following one of the regulation changes mentioned. 
Dummies for the years 2006 and 2013 will show the direct change of regulation on the 
subsequent year’s compensation structures. In Table 3 you can find a summary of the 
variables, which quantify the time changes, and the aforementioned dummy variables and 
in addition interaction terms between these variables and the IT industry dummy. 
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IV. Data and Empirical Results 
In this section I will briefly describe the dataset and the steps taken to compile 
and create the set to be used in the regression. I will also talk about some of the 
descriptive information and the variables used in the study as well as the regression and 




Using the Execucomp data set, as well as the annual company data from 
Compustat, I was able to compile a dataset that would allow me to analyze the changing 
use of compensation over the past two decades. Execucomp compiles compensation on 
executives at companies within the S&P 1500. The dataset starts at the year 1992 and 
covers over two decades of compensation data until 2014. Compustat compiles company 
data from balance sheet to financial statement to cash flow details and provides an annual 
summary for North American companies both public and private. Using Excel and Stata I 
was able to import annual data from the Compustat database and integrate it into the 
Execucomp data set over 3,300 company compensation data. Included in the Execucomp 
data set are the respective Standard&Poor’s Industry Codes and descriptions. I used these 
industry codes to separate the data by industry and identify the specific industries that 
contained information technology companies. Table 1 covers the four industries as well 
as their respective subsections as well as listing the respective S&P Industry codes. 
Narrowing down this data set was particularly important in order to see trends among top 
executives. I chose to only focus on CEO and CFO data in this study. Unfortunately 
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during the data gathering process some of the variables defined in the previous section 
limited the observable range of the study. The regressions in the following sections will 
focus on the years 2005-2014. 
 Using this dataset I created multiple time and industry dummies to help analyze 
the data. Specifically I introduced a time trend variable, which depends on which year 
observations occurred. This time trend variable will help show the overall effect each 
year has had on the compensation methods. In addition I added dummies for years 
following regulation changes. 
B. Descriptive Information 
Table 6 provides an overall outlook of all the variables discussed in the previous 
section as well as providing mean and median values for each variable. The table also 
features a P-value test of difference that identifies the variables with significantly 
different means between IT executives and non-IT executives. Due to the lack of data 
regarding dividend payouts a limited regression would have to be run and in order to 
observe a greater sample of compensation data I chose to drop the dividend rate from the 
regression. Using a four-step model allowed me to compare effects across time and with 
interaction terms I was able to identify the specific industrial affect over time as well as 
affects due to the three regulation changes. In the preliminary preparation for this study 
data was to be used from 1992 until 2014 but due to the nature of data collection a period 
of ten years was used instead (2005-2014). This data range will still allow me to account 
for the largest regulation change, FAS123R, and still provides a large amount of 
observations to appropriately provide insight into the last decade of change within 
compensation. 
27 | P a g e  
 
C. Results 
A table of the four models used and mentioned in the previous section can be 
found in Table 7 after the Bibliography. For the purpose of conciseness in this section I 
will summarize the first regression using the term, Original117 to refer to the variables 
used in all 4 of the models. I will go over my findings by differentiating between the four 
models and by summarizing the differences between them. 
Model 1 
The first equation is shown below. Model 1 is meant to show the overall trend that 
option use has gone through over the past 10 years across all the companies in the study 
and provide a basis for comparison with the next three models with.  
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 +  𝜀𝑗 
OptionShare, as defined in Table 2, is the percentage of total compensation that an 
executive receives in the form of a stock option payment. As mentioned at the start of this 
section the Original11 refers to the eleven variables defined in the Methodology and 
Theory section, excluding the dividend rate as explained above.  
Focusing on the first eleven variables we see that there are eight significant 
variables. Return was significant at a 5% level however it indicated that for every one 
percent increase in current company stock price an executive would receive a 0.0047% 
decrease in OptionShare. Lagged Return was also significant but the correlation 
coefficient was miniscule and did not have any large effect on OptionShare. For every 
1% increase in Volatility, on average, OptionShare increases by 0.032% and the 
                                                          
7 The original eleven variables are Book-To-Market, Return, LReturn, Age, Volatility, Stock Held/Total 
Pay, Stock Held/Firm Equity, Options Held/Total Pay, Options Held/Firm Equity, Debt to Assets and 
finally Market Size. 
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correlation is significant at the 5% level. All but one of the four variables used to account 
for ownership were deemed to be significant at the 1% level, however Options Held/ 
Firm Equity was not significant at any level. This falls in line with the previous study 
performed by Anderson, Banker and Ravindran. Stock Held / Firm Equity had the 
largest effect on Option use with a 1% increase leading to a .277% increase in 
OptionShare. Debt to Assets was also significant at the 1% level, demonstrating a 
0.065% decrease in OptionShare for every 1% increase in the ratio. 
Focusing on the Time Trend variable I observe that since 1992 the companies in 
the study have decreased OptionShare by 0.6277 every year. This means that over the 10 
year period of this study the percentage of options being used within compensation 
packages decreased by 6.277%. In the following section I will discuss the findings of 
Model 2 which accounts for periods following regulation changes.  
Model 2 
 In this model two dummy variables were introduced for the years 2006, and 2013 
as follows: 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝑑2006 + 𝑑2013 + 𝜀𝑗 
Following the introduction of these variables there was no significant change within the 
correlations of the Original11 variables in the study. Moving on to the dummy variables 
we find that after the revision of FAS123 revision OptionShare decreased by -4.619% 
which falls in line with the previous study done by Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu. Taking into 
account the year 2013 we see that OptionShare across all the companies within the study 
rose by 0.745% however this result is not significant at the 5% level. The Time Trend 
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which was introduced in the first model was still significant at the 1% level and the 
correlation increased after accounting for the two years with the introduction of the 
dummy variables. Time Trend is now associated with a yearly decrease in OptionShare 
of 0.794 percent or 7.94 percent decrease over the time period of this study. It is clear that 
within the companies of this study option use as a form of compensation has decreased 
dramatically over the past decade when accounting for the variables defined in 
Methodology and Theory and that FAS123R had a large affect while any introductions 
from the Dodd Frank Act did not seem to provide any deterrent to option use. 
Model 3 
 In this regression Model 1 was used and the Time Trend variable was replaced 
with an interaction variable composed of the Time Trend variable and a dummy for IT 
companies. This variable allows for the observation of an average yearly OptionShare 
change in companies within the Information Technology Industry.  
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) +  𝜀𝑗 
There were no significant changes in the Original11 variables results aside from a 
decrease in the significance of volatility which saw it fall outside the 5% level. The 
association of Stock Held/Firm Equity with OptionShare increased slightly from 
0.277% to 0.308% for each 1% increase in the variable. The new interaction of Time 
Trend and dIT showed that over the ten year period companies within the IT industry 
increased their option use by a yearly average of 0.205%, after accounting for other 
factors which affect option use. This indicates that over the period IT industries did not 
suffer the same average yearly affect that other companies did over the time period. 
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However further isolation of the regulation period is needed to identify whether or not 
companies within the IT industry actually observed positive option use. 
Model 4 
 In this final model an additional two interaction terms were added to the 
regression in order to observe the change regulation had on the IT industry. The 
regression was run as follows: 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + (𝑑2006 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) +
                                             (𝑑2013 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + 𝜀𝑗  
The Original11 variables did not see any significant changes from the previous model 
but the introduction of the two new interaction terms showed much different results from 
the results in Model 3. (𝑑2006 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇), although not significant at the 5% level as it was 
in Model 2, showed that OptionShare use did not decrease as much as it did for non IT 
companies with the introduction for the revised FAS123. A coefficient of -2.184% was 
much lighter than the -4.619% in Model 2 which indicates the industry is not as sensitive 
to regulation changes as others. When interacting the IT dummy and the year 2013 we 
see that there is a 2.181% decrease in OptionShare in the year within IT companies a 
much different scenario than Model 2 which indicated there was an increase in option use 
among all companies. Finally when observing (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) we find that there is 
little change between this model and the previous. After accounting for the regulation 
changes we find that there was a very small yearly change from 0.205% to 0.226% which 
is a total of 0.21% over the past decade.   
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V. Conclusion 
The results of this study indicate three different aspects one old and two new. 
First of all the results indicate that there has been a drastic decrease in option use within 
all companies following the introduction of FAS123(r) which reinforces previous studies 
done on this issue but this study has shown that there is a significant decrease in option 
use over the past decade even when accounting for regulation changes and other factors. 
Second, we can also observe that the IT industry has not reduced their use of options at 
any greater level than the remaining industries, if anything companies within the industry 
are less sensitive to the regulation changes over the past decade and have actually 
increased option use after factoring in other variables. Finally it seems that the industry 
has seen a large decline in option use in 2013 however I do not believe it has to do with 
the specific passing of Dodd Frank Section 952. Overall this study has revealed that the 
industry is less sensitive to regulation change and that option use is still strong within IT 
firms. The IT industry is always on the hunt for innovation and it would be wise that an 
industry with high ambitions. 
There are copious amounts of areas that could be researched within this topic. 
Focus on other industries should reveal how regulation has affected option use and with 
the recent financial crisis, studies within the financial sector would be a useful avenue for 
future research. Other areas for research would also include lawmaking. Studies of 
incentives for option use could provide lawmakers with more guidance on policies that 
would target specific industries or control risk-taking.  
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The table below summarized the companies that fall within the IT grouping used in this 









Code Industry Group Sub-Industry
4510 Software & Services Internet Software & Services
IT Consulting &  other Services








Computer Storage & Peripherals





4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment Semiconductor Equipment
Semiconductors
5010 Telecommunication Services Alternative Carriers
Integrated Telecommunication Services
Wireless Telecommunication Services
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Table 2 






OptionShare The percentage of total compensation that an executive 
receives in the form of a stock option payment
Book-to-Market A ratio between the book value of the firm and the market 
value of the firm. Calculated by dividing the book value per 
share and the market price per share which are both 
included in Execucomp data.
Return The percentage return of a company's share price over the 
year
LReturn The percentage return of a company's share price over the 
year lagged by one year. (The variable Return lagged by 
one year)
Dividend Rate The amount of dividend paid out per share from the 
company
Age Age of executive in observation
Volatility Stock volatility for specific company in an observation
Stock Held/Total Pay The total amount of stock held by an executive divided by 
the total amount of compensation in a given year
Stock Held/Firm Equity The total amount of stock held by an executive divided by 
the total equity of the firm in a given year
Options Held/Total Pay The total amount of options held (exercisable and 
unexercisable) divided by the total amount of compensation 
in a given year
Options Held/Firm Equity The total amount of options held (exercisable and 
unexercisable) divided by the total equity of the firm in a 
given year
Debt to Assets The total debts of a company divided by the total assets of 
the company
Market Size The total market volume of the company calculated by the 
close price times the total shares outstanding








Time Trend A variable which is dependent on which year an observation 
occurs. Each year is assigned a number and (0-21)
d2006 A dummy for the year 2006 (year following FAS123(r))
d2013 A dummy for the year 2013 (year following Dodd Frank)
Time Trend * dIT Interaction term between Time Trend and IT industry 
d2006 * dIT Interaction term between d2006 and IT industry dummy
d2013 * dIT Interaction term between d2013 and IT industry dummy




The mean value of salary and options granted compared to the total amount of 





1992 407.98 918.43 1881.92 
1993 421.65 1744.47 1961.10 
1994 425.99 1643.83 2368.04 
1995 411.09 1988.21 2593.30 
1996 412.08 3130.77 3337.59 
1997 400.82 4511.44 4450.08 
1998 408.21 3585.97 5349.31 
1999 409.53 6430.51 6816.62 
2000 432.53 10096.80 10468.55 
2001 462.10 7100.14 8215.50 
2002 462.09 3549.52 4641.14 
2003 468.69 2358.13 3737.15 
2004 494.56 2838.65 4133.43 
2005 525.95 2829.80 4150.25 
2006 457.17 1281.23 3449.04 
2007 432.27 1203.36 2770.70 
2008 460.74 1440.49 2865.61 
2009 467.60 1267.64 2710.55 
2010 486.49 1235.67 3314.68 
2011 503.58 1515.49 4068.14 
2012 515.17 1234.06 3598.66 
2013 520.16 1615.85 3865.74 
2014 555.08 1220.56 4086.62 
Total 467.94 2731.33 4096.08 
 
  




The mean value of salary and options granted compared to the total amount of 








1992 464.83 441.54 1662.92
1993 479.43 532.02 1753.95
1994 480.06 726.35 1930.79
1995 490.16 641.49 1988.37
1996 502.97 1151.60 2760.19
1997 516.99 1399.09 3196.11
1998 528.93 1757.09 3521.63
1999 548.28 2047.80 4092.13
2000 562.23 2547.00 4805.29
2001 576.81 2305.30 4478.39
2002 584.21 1595.95 3908.97
2003 593.60 1210.79 3668.54
2004 616.29 1364.62 4156.97
2005 645.25 1296.89 4433.93
2006 565.17 805.09 3774.97
2007 556.51 750.84 3494.86
2008 579.71 726.69 3312.81
2009 598.32 607.57 3017.66
2010 620.44 641.38 3603.63
2011 631.56 661.97 3737.70
2012 646.50 573.97 3826.02
2013 669.18 655.88 4256.02
2014 703.39 664.78 4676.88
Total 585.08 1018.62 3594.53
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Table 6 
Summary of the variables defined in section three of the study and compared between 






firms pval It firms
non-it 
firms pval
Option Share 32.75% 21.82% 0.000 24.54% 14.46% 0.000
Book-to-Market 0.26 0.22 0.806 0.42 0.48 0.000
Return 67.85% 59.93% 0.819 3.62% 5.95% 0.000
Lagged Return 47.54% 53.14% 0.850 3.53% 6.28% 0.000
Dividend Rate 1.90% 2.20% 0.000 1.50% 1.90% 0.000
Age 52.08 53.97 0.000 52 54 0.000
Volatility 49.57% 40.54% 0.000 46.50% 37.35% 0.000
Stock Held/Total Pay 14381% 268% 0.021 15.29% 10.15% 0.000
Stock Held/Firm Equity 232% 178% 0.000 4.54% 0.51% 0.000
Options Held/Total Pay 24.22% 11.99% 0.000 15.08% 4.38% 0.000
Options Held/Firm Equity 10.93% 13.15% 0.068 3.36% 2.23% 0.000
Debt to Assets 61.14% 43.66% 0.000 39.30% 59.47% 0.000
Market Size 8432.72 7597.44 0.002 1130.36 1657.14 0.000




Results of for the following four regressions. 
 
Model 1: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑗 
Model 2: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝑑2006 + 𝑑2013 + 𝜀𝑗 
Model 3: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) +  𝜀𝑗 
Model 4: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = ∝ + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙11 + (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + (𝑑2006 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) +
                                                 (𝑑2013 ∗ 𝑑𝐼𝑇) + 𝜀𝑗  
 
  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4






Time Trend * dIT 0.2053 0.2255
(9.24) (9.35)
d2006 * dIT -2.1837
(-0.73)
d2013 * dIT -2.1806
(-2.08)
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Return -0.0047 -0.0051 -0.0039 -0.0038
(-2.83) (-3.06) (-2.4) (-2.34)
Lagged Return 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(2.37) (2.38) (2.39) (2.39)
Book-to-Market -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001
(-0.99) (-1.03) (-0.51) (-0.49)
Age 0.0005 0.0043 0.0034 0.0044
(0.02) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18)
Volatility 0.0323 0.0300 0.0205 0.0199
(2.8) (2.6) (1.77) (1.72)
Options Held / Total Pay 0.0162 0.0163 0.0159 0.0160
(3.5) (3.53) (3.45) (3.46)
Options Held / Firm Equity -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0013
(-0.16) (-0.14) (-0.18) (-0.19)
Stock Held / Total Pay 0.0061 0.0061 0.0063 0.0063
(3.99) (4.04) (4.13) (4.13)
Stock Held / Firm Equity 0.2774 0.2808 0.3082 0.3086
(3.41) (5.48) (6.05) (6.06)
Market Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(5.89) (5.84) (5.4) (5.41)
Debt to Assets -0.0648 -0.0645 -0.0516 -0.0513
(-10.4) (-10.36) (-8.04) (-7.99)
Constant 41.79206 38.7812 25.6791 25.6230
(17.63) (17.96) (17.29) (17.25)
R-Squared 0.0391 0.0404 0.0425 0.0429
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0379 0.039 0.0413 0.0415
Observations 9558 9558 9558 9558
